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3Ju t~e ~upreme Q!nurt 
nft~t 
~tute nf 'ltu~ 
TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANCIS BOYDELL GOELTZ, a 
single man, 
Defendant, 
and 
MARIAN STORY GOELTZ, a single 
woman, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8476 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent in order to amplify and make more defi-
nite certain facts of this case presents the following 
supplemental Statement of Facts: 
1. Status of title of mortgaged premises from the 
year 1936 to the year 1952. 
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(a) The defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, and 
the defendant and appellant, 1\{arian Story Goeltz, were 
husband and wife on July 30, 1936 (date of deed from 
the Bronsons to Mr. and Mrs. Goeltz), on October 27, 
1936 (date of execution of the 1936 mortgage owned and 
held by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.), and on May 
10, 1948 (date of 1948 mortgage involved in this action) 
(Exhibit 2 P, Entries 54, 55, 65; Appellant's Answer and 
Counterclaim, par. 2 of Second Defense; R. 12 ;) Appel-
lant's Answer to Supplemental Complaint, pars. 3 and 4, 
R. 50, R. 153). 
(b) Francis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant were di-
vorced by decree of Third Judicial District Court dated 
March 31, 1952 (Exhibit 2 P, Entries 77-80). They were 
thereafter remarried and were again divorced by decree 
of said Court dated January 15, (Ex. 2 P, Entries 
82, 83). 
(c) Francis Boyd ell Goeltz and Appellant obtained 
title .as joint tenants to the mortgaged pren1ises by virtue 
of a Warranty deed dated July 30, 1936, executed by ~f. 
J. Bronson and Alice 0. Bronson, his wife, as grantors. 
This deed was recorded in the office of the Recorder 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, on July 31, 1936 (Ex. 2 P, 
Entry 54; Ex. 3 P). 
(d) F·rancis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant owned 
the mortgaged premises as joint tenants on October 27, 
1936, the date of 1936 mortgage o'vned and held by 
Pacific Mutual Life Insuranee Co. (Ex. 2 P, Entry 55; 
Ex. 4 P). 
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(e) Francis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant owned the 
mortgaged premises as joint tenants on May 10, 1948, 
date of 1948 mortgage involved in this action (Ex. 2· P, 
Entry 65). 
(f) Pursuant to said deeree of the 'Third District 
Court dated March 31, 1952 (Ex. 2 P, Entries 77-80) 
Fr.ancis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant on April 30, 1952, 
quit claimed the mortgaged premises to one Elise Davis 
(Ex. 2 P, Entry 70, Ex. 7 P) who in turn on April 30, 
1952 quit claimed the same to Appellant (Ex. 2 P, Entry 
71, Ex. 87). Therefore, from date of acquisition of title 
from the Bronsons on July 30, 1936, to March 31, 1952 
(date of court decree aforesaid) a period of 15 years and 
8 months, the title to the n1ortgaged premises stood on 
the public records of Salt Lake County, Utah, in the 
names of Francis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant as joint 
tenants (Ex. 2 P, Entries 54, 55, 65, 67, 70, 71, 77-80). 
2. History of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. 
1936 mortgage. 
(a) This mortgage was dated October 27, 1936, and 
was executed by Fr.ancis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant, 
husband and wife, in favor of Respondent (Ex. 13 P and 
Ex. 4 P). It secured a promissory note signed by Francis 
Boydell Goeltz and Appellant in the principal amount of 
$6,000.00 (Ex. 22 P). The Appellant admitted the execu-
tion of this note and mortgage - they were produced 
by her on demand of Respondent - and she admitted the 
genuineness of her signatures thereon (Appellant's 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
Answer to Respondent's Supplemental Complaint, par 4; 
R. 147; R. 100, 101, 102). 
(b) This mortgage was assigned by Respondent to 
The RF·C Mortgage Co. on May 5, 1937, by written assign-
ment bearing said date (Ex. 2 P, Entry 56; Ex. 5 P). 
(c) The RFC Mortgage Company assigned this 
mortgage to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. by assign-
ment dated June 21,1938 (Ex. 2 P, Entry 60; Ex. 6 P). 
(d) Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. was the 
owner of this mortgage on May 10, 1948. The balance 
due on same amounted to the sum of $3,224.41 (Exs. 16 P, 
18 P, 14 P; R. 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 107, 108). This amount 
was paid by Respondent to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, (Ex. 14 P, R. 76, 77, 106, 107) and the pay-
ment was part of the 1948 loan in original principal 
amount of $7,100.00 (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 26 D, 27 D; R. 76, 
77, 106, 107). The balance of the amount then due on the 
original $7,100.00 mortgage in the sum of $3,851.60 was 
paid to Francis Boydell Goeltz (Ex. 15 P; R. 76, R. 108). 
3. Negotiation of 1948 Mortgage loan. 
With respect to the 1948 loan Francis Boydell Goeltz, 
talked with Henry E. Ogaard, Secretary of Respondent 
about May 10, 1948 (R. 79). In the conversation Mr. 
Goeltz stated that "he vvould like to borrow more money 
for the purpose of ren1odeling the hon1e." Ogaard ex-
plained to hiln that the· only w,ay it could be done would 
be for Respondent to make a new loan and pay off the 
old loan - referring to the 1936 n1ortgage then o'vned 
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by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. (R. 79, 80). Re-
spondent could not have made a new loan without paying 
the Pacific Mutual Mortgage (R. 81). Francis Boydell 
Goeltz has admitted of record that he exeeuted and 
delivered to Respondent the 1948 note and mortgage for 
a good and valuable consideration (Answer of Francis 
Boy dell Goeltz, R. 19, 20). 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
Respondent believes that it can more effectively sub-
mit its argument in opposition to that of Appellant by 
dividing its presentation into two principal parts. Part 
A will discuss the legal issues involved in this appeal 
in an affirmative manner setting forth Respondent's 
theories of the case and demonstrating their validity in 
sustaining the judgment of the trial court. Part B will 
analyze the legal authorities cited by Appellant and 
demonstrate their inapplicability and the erroneous con-
clusions of Appellant. 
PART A 
RESPONDENT'S CA'SE AND DEMONSTRATION OF 
VALDITY OF JUDGMENT 
POINT I. 
THE MORTGAGE DATED MAY 10, 1948 (Ex. lOP) IS 
EFFECTUAL TO BIND THE INTEREST OF DEFENDANT, 
FRANCIS BO·YDELL GOELTZ, IN THE PREMISES DE-
SCRIBED THEREIN AS IT EXISTED ON THE DATE OF 
EXECUTION O:F SAID MORTGAGE BY SAID DEFENDANT. 
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1. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the date of the execution of the mortgage dated 
May 10, 1948, the Appellant and Francis Boydell Goeltz 
were then husband· and wife ,and owned the mortgaged 
premises in fee simple as joint tenants and not as tenants 
in common. (Ex. 3 P-Bronson deed); Ex. 2 P (Abstract 
of Title Ex. 2 P) ). Francis Boydell Goeltz, admits that 
he executed said mortgage dated May 10, 1948 (Ex.lO P) 
and the promissory note secured by said mortgage (Ex. 
9 P) ,and the agreement (Ex. 11 P) (Answer of defend-
ant, Francis Boyd ell Goeltz). 
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES 
(a) A joint tenant rnay sell and convey his inter-
est in real property held in joint tenancy to 
a stranger and such conveyance will result in 
a severance or termination of the joint 
tenancy alld the creation of a tenancy in 
common between the stranger and the re-
rnaining or·iginal owner of the property. 
See con1plete .annotation in 129 A.L.R. 814. 
Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) 
Vol. 4, pg. 317, Sec. 1780. 
Schwartzbaugh vs. Sampson, 11 Cal. App. 
(2d) ±51, 5-± p 2d. 73; 
Smith vs. Sn1ith, 290 Mich. 143; 287 N.W. 
411; 129 A.L.R. 215; 
Coff vs. Y oun1an, 237 Wis. 643; 298 N.W. 
179 ; 134 A.L.R. 952 ; 
Lawler vs. Byrne, 252 Ill. 194; 96 N.E. 892. 
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"A joint tenancy may be servered, either 
voluntarily, as by partition of the property, or a 
conveyance of the interest of any joint tenant, or 
involuntarily, as by an execution s.ale of any inter-
est that is subject thereto. IJiowever, the mere 
docketing of a judgment against a joint tenant 
even though a lien results therefrom, does not 
result in a severance of a joint estate.t Whenever 
such severance takes place the joint tenancy termi-
nates and the right of survivorship is destroyed. 
A third person to whon1 a joint tenant conveys his 
interest holds it as tenant in common with the 
other owners, for the rule is that anything which 
destroys the unity of possession will turn the 
interest servered from the others into a tenancy 
in common as regards to remaining joint ten-
ants * * *." 
(14 Am. Jur., Co-tenancy, Sec. 14, pg. 86). 
(b) A joint tenant of real estate has a right 
to mortgage his interest in the property 
without either the knowledge or consent 
of the co-owner. 
"A joint owner of real estate has a right to 
mortgage his interest in the property without 
either the knowledge or consent of his co-owner. A 
party who holds a deed of trust or lien against the 
joint owners' undivided interest in real estate has 
a right to foreclose his lien on the· debtor's interest 
in the real property. -where joint tenants have 
executed a deed of trust or lien to secure the indi-
vidual debt of one of the joint ovvners, in a fore-
closure proceeding, the joint owners h,ave the 
right to require the interest of the party who is 
primarily liable for the debt to be sold before their 
interest in the property is offered for sale. Any 
interest in real estate which a person may sell and 
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convey he may also mortgage. The joint tenancy 
is severed by the mortgage, at any rate for the 
time being, and until it is paid or redeemed." 
(Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.) 
Vol. 4, pg. 4, pg. 317, Sec. 1782). 
"A mortgage or pledge of the joint property 
is not binding on the co-tenants who do not join 
in its execution, unless by reason of their knowl-
edge and acquiescence they are estopped to deny 
its validity; and a ratification by such co-tenants 
will not relate back so as to give the mortgage 
validity to the prejudice of other creditors. Such 
a mortgage will bind the share or interest of the 
joint tenant who has executed the mortgage. The 
undivided interest of a joint tenant may be made 
the subject of a n~ortgage by him without the con-
sent or concurrence of his co-tenants and to the 
extent of the mortgage lien the·· right of the sur-
vivors will be destroyed or suspended and the 
equity of rede1nption at the death of the mort-
gagor tenant will be all that will fall to his sur-
viving co-tenants." (Emphasis supplied.) 
( 48 C. J. Sec., Joint Tenancies, Sec. 16, pg. 
936); 
2 American Law of Property (1952), Sec. 6.10 
10; 
Joint Tenancies (Ogden), Proceedings of 
Section of Real Property, Probate and 
Trust La,v (1952) of A B A at pages 
17, 18 and 19. 
(c) In states where a nzortgage creates a 
lien, the execution and delivery of a 
mortgage by a joint tenant covering his 
~interest in real property effects a sever-
a,nce and a tenancy in con~mon is created 
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to the extent of the mortgage lien, and 
to this extent the right of the survivor is 
distroyed or s1tspended and the right of 
redemption at the death of the mortgag-
ing tenant before issuance of the Sher-
iff's deed on foreclosure will be all that 
falls to the surviving tenant. 
"Tenants of this kind are said to hold indi-
vidually and jointly, having one and the same 
interest, accruing through one and the same con-
veyance, commencing at the same time, and held 
by one .and the same possession. Upon the death 
of one joint tenant, there being no severance of 
the estate, his entire interest is cast upon the sur-
vivor or survivors, to the exclusion of the inheri-
tance of the same by his heirs. The interest of 
the survivor in the realty is consequently in-
creased by the extinguishment of the tenant de-
ceased. It is settled in law that a joint tenant 
may alienate or convey to a stranger his p.art or 
interest in the realty, and thereby defeat the right 
of the survivor. * * * In the ancient language of 
the law, joint tenants were said to hold per my et 
per tout, or in plain words "by the moiety or half 
or by all," the true interpretation of this phrase 
being th.at these tenants were seized of the entire 
realty for the purpose of tenure and survivorship, 
while for the purpose of imrnediate alienation each 
had only a particular part or interest. * * * The 
interest of each tenant is subject to sale upon 
execution. Having these rights and powers at 
least over his interest in the land so held there 
c.an be no sufficient reason urged why the power 
of a joint tenant to rnortgage same should be 
denied. Any interest in real estate which a person 
n1ay sell and convey he may also mortgage. 
(Jones, Mortg. Sec. 13G). vV e are therefore of 
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the opinion that a joint tenant may mortgage his 
interest in the joint estate in like manner as 
though he were a tenant in common and to the ex-
tent of the mortgage lien the right of the survivor 
wil.l be destroyed or suspended, and the equity of 
redemption, at the death of the tenant, will be all 
that will fall to the surviving companion. The 
right of the tenant to mortgage is supported by 
the following authorities: York vs. Stone, 1 Salk. 
158; Simpson's Lessee vs. Ammons, 1 Bin. 175. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
(Wilkins vs. Young, 144 Indiana 1; 41 N.E. 
68.) 
A mortgage was executed by two of three 
joint tenants. The court held that the mortgage, 
although only for security, effected a severance of 
the joint tenancy. 
(Simpson's Lessee vs. Ammons, 1 Binney 
(Perm.) 175, 2 American Dec. 425). 
3. ARGUMENT 
It is manifest that the mortgage dated !fay 10, 1948 
(Ex. 10 P), constitutes a valid and enforceable obligation 
against Francis Boydell Goeltz, and the lien thereof 
attached to and bound his undiYided one-half interest 
in the mortgaged pre1nises. The lien of this mortgage 
continued as against the undivided interest of Francis 
Boydell Goeltz in the Inortgaged premises after he and 
Mrs. Goeltz subsequently quit clain1ed the n1ortgaged 
premises to Elise Davis (Ex. 2 P Abstract of title; Ex. 
7 P Deed fro1n Goeltz to Davis) .and after Elise Davis 
conveyed the mortgaged pren1ises to 1\frs. Goeltz. (Ex. 
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2 P Abstract of title; Ex. 8 P, Deed from Davis to Marian 
Story Goeltz.) 
The promissory note dated May 10, 1948 (Ex. 9 P) 
is a joint and several obligation. Defendant, Francis Boy-
dell Goeltz, admits his own execution of this note and the 
1nortgage (Ex. 10 P) securing payment of s.ame. There-
fore, Francis Boydell Goeltz is liable on this note for the 
amount which is in excess of the then principal amount of 
the Pacific Mutual mortgage hereinafter described, which 
excess amount on date of this mortgage amounted to the 
sum of $3,579.44 (testimony of Henry E. Ogaard R. 76), 
together with interest thereon and re.asonable attorney's 
fees, cost of suit and incurring costs. His undivided one-
half interest in the mortgaged premises as it existed on 
date of execution and delivery of said note and mortgage 
became and is now subject to a lien for this total judg-
ment obligation. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT IS SUBROGATED TO RIGHTS OF THE 
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO~MPANY AGAINST 
THE ENTIRE O·WNERSHIP AND INTEREST OF THE DE-
FENDANTS IN THE MORTGAGED PREMISES UNDER THE 
MORTGAGE DATED OCTOBER 27, 1936. (Ex. 23 P, Ex. 4 P) 
EXECUTED BY THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH MORTGAGE 
WAS O:WNED BY SAID INSURANCE COMPANY ON DATE 
OF EXECUTION O·F MO·RTGAGE IN RESPONDENT'S 
FAVOR (Ex. 10 P) DATED MAY 10, 1948. 
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 27, 1936, the Appellant and Defendant 
Francis Boydell Goeltz then husband and wife, were the 
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owners of the mortgaged premises in fee simple as joint 
tenants and not as tenants in common, (Ex. 2 P. Abstract 
of Title; Ex. 3 P, Bronson deed; Admission of Francis 
Boydell Goeltz, Answer of Francis Boydell Goeltz; 
Testimony of Marian Story Goeltz R. 153.) On that 
date they borrowed the sum of $6,000.00 from Respondent 
and to evidence their indebtedness executed and de-
livered their joint and several promissory notes in favor 
of Respondent (Ex. 22 P) and. their mortgage securing 
payment of said note covering the mortgaged premises 
(Ex. 23 P). This note and mortgage were produced in 
open court from the possession of Appellant, Marian 
Story Goeltz. She in her testimony admitted the genuine-
ness of her signature on both of said documents (R. 147), 
and the witness H. D. Henager testified positively that 
Mr. and Mrs. Goeltz signed both the note and mortgage 
in his presence (R. 101, 102). This note (Ex. 22 P) and 
this mortgage (Ex. 23 P) dated October 27, 1936, for 
$6,000.00 were thereafter sold and assigned by the Re-
spondent to The R.F.C. l\fortgage Company (Ex. 5 P) 
which subsequently sold and assigned them to The Pacific 
Mutual Life Insurance Company (Ex. 6 P). On May 
10, 1948 (date of execution and deliYery of Exs. 9 P and 
10 P) the Respondent did not o"rn or hold any interest 
either directly or indirectly in said note (Ex. 22 P) and 
mortgage (Ex. 23 P). It 'Yas .acting as collection agent 
only for The Pacific ~Iutnal Life Insurance Company. 
(Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard (R. 73, 76, 88) and H. D. 
Henager). There "'n8 due and payable to The Pacific 
Mutual Life Insura.nce Con1pany on ~fay 10., 19-!S, on 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
said note and mortgage dated October 27, 1936 (Exs. 22 P 
and 23 P) the total sum of $3,224.41. (Ex. 14 P, check 
in favor of The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company; 
testimony of Henry E. Ogaard; testimony of H. D. Hen-
ager (R. 106). At the time (a few days prior to May 10, 
1948), the defendant Francis Boyd ell Goeltz applied to 
the Respondent for a new mortgage loan on the security 
of the mortgaged premises, he talked with witness Henry 
E. Ogaard. (Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard R. 72). 
Ogaard informed Goeltz that the only way the then 
existing mortgage (then owned by The Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Company) indebtedness could be in-
creased was by way of a new loan evidenced by a new 
note .and mortgage in favor of Respondent, the proceeds 
of which would be used in part to pay the balance then 
due on the mortgage of October 27, 1936, then owned by 
The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company. Goeltz 
agreed to this requirement (R. 72, 79, 80). Goeltz at that 
time stated he wanted funds with which to pay the cost 
of remodeling the house situated on the mortgaged 
premises (R. 79), but Ogaard declared to hin1 that the 
old loan (Ex. 22 P and 23 P) must be paid (testimony 
of l-Ienry E. Ogaard R. 79). When the note and mortgage 
evidencing the new loan (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P) had been 
drafted, Goeltz first informed Henager that Mrs. Goeltz 
was unable to appear at the office of Respondent-to 
execute these documents (R. 104). Hen,ager refused to 
allow Goeltz to take the note, mortgage and agreement 
from the office to secure 1\irs. Goeltz' signature (R. 104). 
Goeltz then conferred with J os. E. Benedict, one of 
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Respondent'·s officers, and thereupon Benedict directed 
Henager to allow Goeltz to take the documents out of the 
office for execution by Mrs. Goeltz. (Testimony of H. D. 
Henager R. 104, 195) ; testimony of J os. E. Benedict 
R. 165, 169). Goeltz thereupon took the documents from 
the office and a few days later returned them to Henager 
(R. 107). On their face they appeared to be properly 
executed and the mortgage duly acknowledged by both 
mortgagors R. 105, 116, 117). Thereupon Henager caused 
two checks to be drawn (R. 107, 108), one in favor of 
The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company for the 
sum of $3,224.41 (Ex. 14 P, R. 106) which Henager de-
livered to Ogaard (R. 107). A second draft for $3,851.68 
was drawn in Goeltz' favor and delivered to him. (Testi-
mony of H. D. Henager R. 107). Ogaard transmitted 
the check for $3,224.41 to the payee insurance company. 
(Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard, R. 75). The evidence 
clearly proves that the proceeds of the mortgage loan 
of May 10, 1948, were disbursed in regular and proper 
manner (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P, 16 P, 17 P, 18 P) and that 
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co1npany was paid and it 
received from the proceeds of the ~lay 10, 1948 loan 
the sum of $3,224.41 in full satisfaction of the indebted-
ness due under the n1ortgage of October 27~ 1936 (Exs. 
4 P, 22 P, 23 P, R. 75, 76). It "'"aS not until June 12, 1951 
that Marian Story Goeltz inforn1ed Benedict, as an 
officer of Respondent, that she had not 'vritten.her pur-
ported signatures on the note, n1ortgage and agreen1ent 
of M.ay 10, 19±8, nor had she authorized any one to sign 
her na1ne thereto. (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P; testimony of 
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Marian Story Goeltz R. 151); testimony of Jos. E. 
Benedict R. 169, 170) ). 
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES 
(a) Where a loan has been obtained by 
means of a forged mortgage and the pro-
ceeds used to pay off existing encunt-
brances against the property, the courts, 
without exception, have held that the 
mortgagee under the void ntortgage ·is 
entitled to be s1tbrogated to the rights of 
the prior mort_qagee. 
See Annotation 1n 43 A.L.R. at pages 
1404, 1405; 
See Annotation 1n 151 A.L.R. at page 
414; 
See Annotation in 70 A.L.R. at pages 
1398-1404. 
"It is well settled that where the security 
given for the loan which is used to pay off .an in-
cumbrance turns out to be void, although the per-
son taking it expected to get good security, he 
will be subrogated to the rights of the holder of 
the lien which the money advanced is used to pay; 
and that in such case the person advancing the 
money cannot be regarded as a stranger or volun-
teer, there being no intervening equity to pre-
vent" ( 25 Ruling Case Law, 1343). 
Newcomber, et al vs. Sibon, 119 Kan. 358; 239 P. 
1110; 43 A.L.R. 1387. (Husband forged wife's 
signature to mortgage.) 
Serial Building Loan and Savings Inst. vs. Eber-
hardt, 95 N.J. Eq. 607, 124 Atl. 56. (I-Iusband 
forged wife's signature to rnortgage.) 
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Davis vs. Pugh, 81 Ark. 253; 99 S.W. 78. (Hus-
band forged wife's signature to mortgage.) 
Zinkeisen vs. Lewis, 63 Kan. 590; 66 P. 644. (Hus-
band forged wife's signature to mortgage.) 
"The authorities ar~ in conflict upon the right 
of one lending money· upon the security of a 
forged or unauthorized mortgage to be subrogated 
to the lien of the prior mortgage which has been 
discharged by the money advanced on the void 
mortgage. However, a majority in number, and 
in our opinion the better reasoned cases, hold that 
one lending money upon the security of a void 
mortgage is entitled to be subrogated to the rights 
of the mortgagee under the prior valid mortgage 
which has been discharged with proceeds of the 
void one." (Landis vs. State, 179 Okla. 547; 66 
P. 2d 519 ; 151 .A..L.R. 403.) Hon1e Owners' Loan 
Corp. vs. Papara, 241 Wis. 112; 3 N.W. (2nd) 730, 
·140 A.L.R. 1289. 
"Subrogation will be allowed to the lender 
of money on the security of a forged deed of trust 
or mortgage, or one which is invalid because of 
the failure of the 'vife to join. JJ!ere negligence of 
the one seeking subrogation in failing to procure a 
properly executed mortgage will not, at least in 
the abse·n.ce of interl~ening equities, defeat his 
right of subrogation." (En1phasis supplied.) 
(50 Am. J ur., Subrogation, Sec. 99, pg. 7 44). 
Katschor vs. Ley, 153 Kan. 569; 113 P. 2d 128. 
(b) "The ge11erally accepted ·v£ew at the pres-
ent thne) holcever, is that it is 1wt neces-
sary that there should be an express 
agreernent that the prior lien shall be 
kept ali.ve for the benefit of one ad,vanc-
t"ng ntoney to pay it) or that it be as-
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signed, but if from all the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding the transaction 
it is clearly to be i~mplied that it was the 
intention of the parties that the person 
making the advance was to have security 
of equal dignity and position with that 
discharged, then equity will so decree. In 
such cases, equity speaking from the 
standpoint of good conscience, substi-
tutes the person so paying the debt to the 
place of the original creditor, so far as 
to enable him to enforce the security 
for the purpose of reimbursement." ( 25 
Ruling Case Law, Sec. 24, cited with 
approval in Martin vs. 1-Iickenlooper, 
infra.) 
"Therefore, whatever may have been the old 
test of what constituted a volunteer, stranger and 
intermeddler, we believe that the decided trend 
of modern authorities is to take a liberal view of 
the question; and being guided by this modern 
view we are of the opinion that a volunteer, a 
stranger, and intermeddler, is one who thrusts 
himself into a situation of his own initiative, and 
not one who becomes a party to a transaction upon 
the urgent petition of a person who is vitally 
interested, and whose rights would be sacrificed 
did he not respond to the importunate appeal. If 
this conception is in keeping with what we believe 
to be the modern and better view, it is clear that 
appellant was no stranger, volunteer or inter-
Ineddler,. If he was not, why should he suffer~" 
In this case James executed a mortgage to 
Schmitt, and then conveyed the mortgaged pre-
Inises to his daughters subject to the mortgage. 
James died. One of the daughters was a rninor. 
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Her guardian joined in a mortgage to plaintiff 
to obtain funds with which to pay the Schmitt 
mortgage. The guardian's mortgage was void 
because of lack of statutory authority in the court 
which authorized the mortgage in the guardian-
ship proceeding. The plaintiff was by this de-
cision subrogated to the rights of Schmitt. (Laf-
franchini vs. Clark, 39 Nev. 48; 153 P. 250.) 
An owner of mortgaged real property died 
intestate leaving a widow and adult children. The 
children conveyed their interest in the real estate 
to their mother. A mortgage on the real property 
was past due. It was necessary to renew it or 
secure a new loan to prevent foreclosure. The 
widow mortgaged the real estate to plaintiff for 
funds used to pay the mortgage against land at 
time of her husband's death. Held, as against ad-
ministrator and general creditors of deceased, 
plaintiff was entitled to be subrogated to the 
rights of the holder of original mortgage. (Fed-
eral Land Bank of Wichita vs. Hanks, 123 Kan. 
329, 254 P. 1040.) 
"In this case Sutherland loaned his money to 
the O"'"ner of the leasehold estate for the purpose 
of paying off the lien held by_ the investment com-
pany, belieYing and expecting that he would get 
the sa1ne security that the con1pany had whose 
liens he paid, but .afterwards learned of the $1,-
000.00 mortgage held by the plaintiff. An appli-
cation of the equitable doctrine of subrogtion to 
the transaetion giYes to the cross-co1nplainant 
(Sutht)rland) the security he " ... as led tQ believe 
he \vas getting, and the srune that was held by 
the creditor 'vhose debt he p.aid, and the plaintiff 
is left the san1e security he had before. Suther-
land is substituted for the investn1ent con1pany as 
creditor and lien holder. * * * Tested alone by 
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the earlier cases, Sutherland might be regarded 
as a volunteer, but latterly the doctrine of subro-
gation has been developed and expanded and given 
a wider application to business matters. By ana-
logy it has been applied to transactions similar to 
the one under consideration - to one having no 
previous interest to protect, who pays off .a mort-
gage, or advances money for its payment, at 
the instance of the mortgagor and for his benefit, 
when no innocent party can be injured, believing 
he is getting security equal to that of the person 
whose debt he pays. We cannot hold Sutherland 
a mere volunteer and stranger, officiously inter-
meddling by paying debts due the Pacific Invest-
ment Company." (George vs. Butler, 16 Utah 
111, 50 p. 1032.) 
Walker Bros. Bankers was administrator of 
the estate of one Merriam. Bingham was adinini-
strator of the estate of one Cr.ane·. Crane in his 
lifetime became indebted to one McMillan. After 
McMillan died his heirs pressed the heirs of Crane 
and Crane's widow for payment. Crane had bor-
rowed funds from one Norman and deposited 
shares of mining stock as security for papnent. 
Merriam had signed the note in favor of Norman 
(along with Crane) as an accomodation maker. 
Norman did not demand pay1nent of his note at 
that time. Before Merria1n's death he attempted 
to negotiate on behalf of l\!rs. Crane a settlement 
of the McMillan debt. Merriam died before com-
pletion of negotiations. The bank, after its a p-
pointment as Merriam's administrator and before 
the appointment of an administrator for Crane's 
estate, renewed these negotiations. It finally 
secured an agreement from lVlrs. Crane alone (no 
administrator having been appointed on her hus-
band's estate) whereby the shares of mining stock 
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held by Norman should be sold and from the pro-
ceeds the Norman note was to be paid and also 
the indebtedness due the McMillan heirs. This 
agreement was carried out. The action was 
brought by the administrator of Crane's estate, 
when he was appointed, against the bank as Mer-
riam's administrator, to recover certain shares of 
mining stock held by Merriam at the time of 
death and the dividends therefrom (and which 
were held by the bank as Merriam's administra-
tor) to be declared the property of the Crane 
estate. The evidence showed that these shares 
of stock belonged to Crane free from claim of 
Merriam or his administrator, and part of them, 
at least, had been transferred to Merriam by 
Crane in fraud of Crane's creditors. The Bank, 
as Merriam's administrator, having paid the debt 
owing from Crane to the McMillan heirs asserted 
the right to be subrogated to the rights of the 
McMillan heirs against the Crane estate. In deny-
ing the right of subrogation the court held that 
(1) There was no legal subrogation because 
neither Merriam nor the bank as his administra-
tor were under compulsion to pay the indebted-
ness due the McMillan heirs.- Merriam's obliga-
tion on the joint note of himself and Crane to 
Norman did not furnish this compulsion. 
"Whe-re the person who p.ays the debt of an-
other stands in the situation of surety or is com-
pelled to pay to protect his own right or property, 
the right of subrogation is a consequence which 
equity attaches to such a condition, and the right 
of subrogation under such circumstances is not a 
direct result of an agreement. This, in law, is 
termed 'legal subrogation.' " 
(2) There was no conventional subrogation 
because the agreement with the 'vidow of Crane 
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did not bind the estate, and as a consequence the 
bank, as administrator, in making payment to the 
McMillan heirs, did not do so under a valid bind-
ing con tract. 
"Conventional subrogation depends upon a 
lawful contract * * *. It requires no argument to 
show that Mrs. Crane's approval and acceptance 
of the defendant's proposal, in so far as it at-
tempted to bind the estate of Elias W. Crane, de-
ceased, is void. (Dunn vs. Wallingford, 4 7 U ta.h 
491, 155 P. 347.) The agreement does not purport 
to assign or in any way bind Mrs. Crane's dis-
tributive share of the estate. Whatever may be 
its affect in that connection is not before us, and 
we do not attempt to say." (Bingham vs. Walker 
Bros. Bankers, Administrator, 75 Utah 149, 283 
P. 1055.) 
Stoven and wife executed a mortgage in 
favor of Utah State Land Board, and then con-
veyed the mortgaged premises to Hickenlooper. 
Hickenlooper executed a second mortgage to Mar-
tin. Thereafter Hickenlooper conveyed the pre-
mises, subject to the two mortgages, to Fritsch 
Loan and Trust Co. Some time later Fritsch Loan 
and Trust Co. executed a mortgage to Zorn and 
the proceeds were used to pay the mortgage to 
the State. Martin's mortgage was of record and 
unreleased. Martin thereafter foreclosed his 
mortgage against Hickenlooper, making Zorn a 
party. Zorn contended that she was subrogated 
to the rights of the State under its mortgage from 
Stoven. The trial court found that Fritsch 
(through its mortgages) agreed that the Zorn 
mortgage should be a first lien and represented it 
was such. The Supreme Court (Wolfe, J.) held: 
(1) That there was no legal subrogation; 
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(2) That there was a "conventional" subro-
gation, writing as follows: 
"Without determining that a 'conventional' 
subrogation will be found in case it appears that 
the lender 'intended' or 'supposed' he was to be 
equally well secured, as he would have been had 
he taken an assignment of the lien his advance-
ments paid off and released (which, if so. decided 
might work a situation where one would be better 
off by failing to examine a record than had he 
taken that precaution) suffice it to say that where 
there is a promise on the part of the mortgagor 
or his transferee, given to one who pays off a lien, 
that such lender would . be equally in as good 
position as regards security as the lienholder 
whose lien his money was intended to discharge 
and did discharge, he will be considered in equity 
as an assignee of the lien and especially where 
assurances are given him that his lien will be 
and is a first lien. The evidence in this case, we 
think is amply sufficient to establish such a pro-
mise." (J\1:artin vs. Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 185, 59 
P. 2d 1139, 61 P. 2d 307; 107 A.L.R. 762.) 
3. ARGUMENT 
There can be no doubt as to the right of the Re-
spondent to be subrogated to the rights of The Pacific 
.. Mutual Life Insurance Co1npany as against the entirt 
interest of the Appellant and Francis Boydell Goeltz 
and each of the1n in and to the mortgaged premises to 
the extent that the proceeds of the 1\Iay 10, 1948 loan 
were used to pay the mortgage indebtedness due on that 
date from the defendants to The Pacific ~Iutual Life In-
surance Company. This an1ounted to the sun1 of $3,224.41 
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with interest for May 10, 1948 at 4¥2% per annum. The 
obligation owing from Appellant and Francis Boydell 
Goeltz to the Insurance Company was a joint and several 
obligation (Ex. 22 P, Ex. 23 P) and admitted by both of 
them to be a valid claim. Therefore, e.ach of them was 
liable for the whole amount of the indebtedness. This 
indebtedness was secured by a mortgage lien (Ex. 23 P) 
upon the entire premises and the total interests of the 
Appellant and Francis Boydell Goeltz in the premises 
were subject to said security lien, the validity of which 
1\!rs. Goeltz frankly admits. 
The authorities cited above clearly demonstrate the 
increasing favor of the modern rule that it is not neces-
sary that there should be an express agreement that the 
prior mortgage lien should be kept alive for the benefit 
of one advancing money to pay it or that it should be 
assigned. The court will consider all of the facts and 
circumstances of the transaction, and, if from same it is 
to be implied that it was the intention of the parties 
that the person making the adv.ance was to have security 
of equal dignity and position with that discharged, then 
the person making the advance is subrogated to all of 
the rights and benefits of the prior mortgage. In this 
case Ogaard informed Goeltz that the only w.ay in which 
a new loan could be negotiated would be by way of using 
part of the proceeds of the new loan to pay the Pacific 
Mutual mortgage. Goeltz agreed thereto. Here is a 
situation that even brings the c.ase squarely within the 
old rule, because this part of the transaction clearly 
shows that the Respondent not only expected, but de-
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manded, a first mortgage lien. The Respondent did not 
merely "suppose" or "intend" that it secure a first 
lien mortgage; it actually required such first mortgage 
lien as security for making a new loan and Goeltz agreed 
thereto. The facts are stronger for subrogation than 
those in Martin vs. Hickenlooper, supra: (a) in this case 
no rights of a third party are involved, e.g. Martin, the 
second mortgagee in the Hickenlooper case (the Respond-
ent is asserting the right of subrogation as to an acknowl-
edged debt under Pacific Mutual's mortgage) and (b) Re-
spondent knew ·of the existence of the Pacific Mutual 
mortgage and demanded that it be paid from the pro-
ceeds of the new loan as a condition precedent to making 
the new loan, "the old loan would have to be paid off" 
(Ogaard's testimony). Whether there is applied to these 
facts the so-called "old" or conservative rule or the "mod-
ern" more equitable rule, the results are the same. Re-
spondent definitely is subrogated to the rights of Pacific 
Mutual against the two Goeltzes personally and also 
against the mortgaged premises as an entirety to the 
extent of $3,224.41, plus interest at 4¥2% per annum from 
May 10, 1948. 
POINT III. 
A SIGNATURE TO AN INSTRUMENT MADE WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY O·F THE PERSON WHOSE SIGNATURE IT 
PURPORTS TO BE IS A DEFENSE AVAILABLE TO HIM 
UNDER SEC. 44-12-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, UN .. 
LESS HE IS ESTOPPED, BUT THE UNAUTHORIZED SIG-
NATURE IS NO DEFENSE TO HIS C0-1\IAKER WHOSE 
SIGNATURE IS GENUINE AND VALID. 
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1. STATEMENT OF FAC'TS 
The signatures of defendant, Marian Story Goeltz, 
on the promissory note, mortgage and agreement dated 
May 10, 1948 (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P) were made without 
her authority. (Testimony of Marian Story Goeltz (R. 
147, 145; testimony of J. Percy Goddard R. 129). The 
Respondent at time of delivery of said instruments to it 
had no knowledge that the defendant, Marian Story 
Goeltz, did not in fact sign these instruments, but was 
the honest belief that they were her genuine signa-
tures. (Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard R. 63; testi-
mony of H. D. Henager R. 105; testimony of Jos. E. 
Benedict R. 171, 172, 173.) The defendant, Francis 
Boydell Goeltz, admits the genuineness of his signatures 
on these instruments which purport to be his signatures, 
and that the instruments as to himself are genuine. 
(Answer of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz.) 
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES 
"\\There a signature is forged, or made with-
out the authority of the person whose signature jt 
purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no 
right to retain the instru1nent or give a discharge 
therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against 
any party thereto can be acqu,ired thro-ugh or 
under such signature, unless the party a.r;ainst 
whom it is sought to enforce such right is pre-
cluded from setting up the forgery or want of 
authority." 
(Sec. 44-1-24, Utah Code Ann. ~953; Unifor1n 
Act, Sec. 23.) 
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"Forgery defined: Every person who, with 
intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters, 
forges ot counterfeits any * * * indenture, * * * 
promissory note * * * or utters, publishes or 
·passes, or attempts to pass, as true and genuine 
any of the above ·named false, altered, forged or 
count.erfeited matters * * * kno-wing the same 
to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited * * ·'~~= 
with intent to prejudice, damage or defraud· any-
person * * * is guilty of forgery." · 
(Sec. ·76-26-1, Utah· Code Ann. 1953.) 
(a) It is not .forgery to write another's name 
, with authority·. To establish forgery the 
proof must show not only the person 
whose name is signed to the. instrument 
did not sign it, but also that his name 
was signed without authority. (State of 
Utah vs. Jones, 81 Utah· 503; 20 P. 2d 
615.) 
(b) An unauthorized signature to a bill or 
note is a defense available to the party 
whose name has been written without his 
authority, but is no defense to a co-
maker whose signature is genuine. (10 
Corpus Juris Sec., Sec. 493, pg. 1086.) 
"The fact that so1ne of the signatures to a 
note are forged does not necessarily render the 
note void against those whose signatures are 
genuine." (Joyce Defenses to Con1mercial Paper 
(2nd Ed.) \T ol. 1,. Sec. 192, pg. 192.) 
"In an action by a payee against one who 
has signed a note as surety, it is no defense 
thereto that the name of one or more of the 
obligors on· such instrun1ent has been forged, 
though the surety signed the sa1ne. in the belief 
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that the signatures were genuine, where it appears 
that the instrument was accepted by the payee 
without notice of the forgery." (Morris Plan Co. 
vs. Alder, et al., 126 Misc. (NY) 237, 213 N.Y. 
Supp. 227.) 
Plaintiff sued on notes signed by Davis and 
also purportedly signed by his wife. Davis ad-
mitted he signed his wife's name to the note 
without .authority. He defended the action on the 
basis of an Oklahoma statute identical with Sec. 
23 of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act. 
Held: "Said statute is not applicable in behalf 
of Davis who did sign the notes." (Davis vs. 
Rotenberg, 124 Okla. 74; 254 P. 37.) 
Defendant was sued on a note which had been 
.altered and as a defense relied on a statute 
equivalent to Sec. 23 of the Uniform Negotiable 
Instrument Act, claiming it released him frorn 
liability. The Court said: "* * * the section pro-
vides that no rights can be predicated upon such 
forged or unauthorized signatures, except against 
a party "who has been precluded from asserting 
the forgery or want of authority, but goes no 
further than to make said signature inoperative 
and to bar enforcement of rights founded thereon. 
The language is carefully chosen to confine the 
effect of the section to the specific points covered 
thereby. It does not purport to declare the instru-
ment void nor the genuine signatures thereon in-
operative. It protects the party whose signatur~ 
has been forged or affixed vvithout his authority; 
but contains no provisions releasing other parties 
from whatever liability they have assumed." 
(Public Bank of New York vs. l(nox-Burchard 
Mer. Co., 135 l\iinn. 171, 160 N. W. 667, 668.) 
"But it does not follow that proof of one 
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forged signature on a note must of necessity and 
in all cases be given affect to avoid the note in 
favor of those whose signatures thereto are found 
to be genuine. Such result is not dictated by 
Code Supp. 1902, Sec. 3060.3 (Sec. 23 N.I. Act). 
* * * It is the forged and unauthorized signature 
that is declared to be inoperative." (Beem vs. 
Farrell, 135 Iowa 670; 113 N.W. 509.) 
See also to the same effect as above: 
Ben tel's Brannon Negotiable Instrument Law 
(7th Ed.), Sec. 23, pg. 437; 
First National Bank of Durant vs. Shaw, 157 
Mich. 192, 121 N.W. 809; 
Van Slyke vs. Rooks, 181 Mich. 88; 147 N.W. 
579; 
Fretwell vs. Carter, 78 S.C. 531; 59 S.E. 639; 
Newark Finance Co. vs. Aocella, 115 N.J. L. 
449, 180 Atl. 863. 
In connection with the application of Sec. 44-1-24, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953 (Sec. 23 of Uniform Act) above 
quoted to the 1948 note and n1ortgage (Ex. 9 P and 10 P) 
it must never be forgotten that in Utah 
"the n1ortgage follows the debt as a mere incident 
and shares the in1111unity of the note fron1 de-
fenses and equities, so that in proceedings to 
enforce the 1nortgage nothing can be alleged 
against it 'vhich could not have been set up as 
a defense to an action at lR\V upon the note." (27 
Cyc. 1324.) 
The above rule was quoted 'vith approval in Smith 
vs. Jarman, 61 Utah 125, 211 Pac. 962, where the Court 
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made the classic statement: "the debt is the principal 
thing." The Court in First National Bank of Salt Lake 
vs. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57 Pac. (2nd) 1401, approved 
Smith vs. Jarman stating: 
"A mortgage is an incident to the obligation 
which it is given to secure. Even though the mort-
gaged property be destroyed the mortg.agors and 
other obligors remain liable for the payment of 
the debt." 
3. ARGUMENT 
Francis Boydell Goeltz .admitted in his answer that 
the signatures on the note, mortgage and agreement 
dated May 10, 1948 (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P), which purport 
to be his signatures are in fact his signatures, and that 
as to himself he executed and delivered these instruments 
to Respondent. 
A casual inspection of the 1948 note (Ex. 9 P) shows 
that it is .a negotiable promissory note (Sec. 44-1-1 to and 
including Sec. 44-1-6, Utah Code Ann. 1953 (Negotiable 
Instruments Act). Therefore, the provisions of Sec. 44-
1-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as construed by the Courts, 
sustains the validity of the 1948 note and mortgage 
against Francis Boydell Goeltz. 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT, MARIAN STORY GOELTZ, AS TO RE-
SPONDENT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE TITLE TO 
THE MORTGAGED PREMISES WAS OTHER THAN SHOWN 
ON THE PUBLI·C DEED RECORDS, TO-WIT THAT THE 
PREMISES WERE HELD IN JOINT TENANCY BY HER-
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SELF AND HER THEN HUSBAND, FRANCIS BOYDELL 
GOELTZ, DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD RESPONDENT 
DEALT WITH THEM. 
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The mortgaged premises were acquired on July 30, 
1936, by the Appellant and her then husband, Francis 
Boydell Goeltz, by w.arranty deed executed by the Bron-
sons, which conveyed the same to Appellant and Francis 
Boydell Goeltz as joint tenants. The title thus acquired 
stood on the public deed records unchanged from date 
of acquisition to March 31, 1952, when the premises were 
awarded Respondent by decree of the Third District 
Court entered in the first divorce action - a period of 
fifteen years and eight months. When both the 1936 
and 1948 mortgages were negotiated, the public deed 
records showed that Respondent and her then husband, 
Francis Boydell Goeltz, owned the premises in joint 
tenancy. 
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES 
"A 1nortgagor is estopped, as against the 
mortgagee fro1n denying that l1e had at the tune 
of the execution of the n1ortgage, seisin or such 
title as the 1nortgage purports to convey." (36 
Am. Jur. l\[ortgages, Sec. :2-±0, pg. 811.) 
"An estopped 'vill .arise against an owner of 
real property, "\Yhere he clothes the person assum-
ing to dispose of the property "\vith apparent title 
to it or with apparent authority to dispose of it 
and when the person setting up the estoppel acts 
and parts 'vith value or extends credit on the 
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fai~th of such apparent ownership and authority." 
(19 Am. Jur. - Estoppel - Sees. 67 and 68, pg. 
687; Annotation L.R.A. 1918 B, pg. 735.) 
(a) Where one of two innocent parties muat 
suffer by fraud perpetrated by another, 
the law imposes the loss upon the party 
who by his misplaced confidence has en-
abled the fra?-td to be committed. 
(19 Am. Jur.- Estoppel- Sec. 67, pg. 
695; Seger vs. ,V. T. Ravvleigh Co., 
153 Va. 514; 50 SE 244; 66 ALR 
305.) 
(b) For a wife to permit the record title of 
her real property to remain in her hus-
band is in itself a representation that he 
is the owner thereof, and if she acquieces 
in his holding of the title for a consider-
able period of time, she is witho1tt 
further act on her part, estop·ped to deny 
his title as against persons who have re-
lied on the appearance which she thus 
allowed to be created. 
Kinsley vs. Bank, 131 Kansas 448, 
292 Pac. 798; 
Annotation 76 ALR at pg. 1507; 
Duckwell vs. Kisner, 136 Ind. 99; 35 
NE 697; 
McCormick Harvester, etc. Co. vs. 
Perkins, 135 Iowa 64, 110 NW 
15; 
Pierce vs. Hower, 142 Ind. 642; 42 
NE 223. 
(c) The existence of the joint tenancy on the 
face of the public record between the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
82 
Goeltz, prohibited Appellant from intro-
ducing evidence to show either her (a) 
entire ownership of the property or (b) 
that her interest therein was greateT 
than the title deed from the Bronsons 
showed on its face because 
(1) Joint tenants hold their prop-
erty by one title and one right, 
which consists of four unities: 
(1) interest (2) title (3) time 
(4) possession. (14 Am. Jur. 
-cotenancy, Sec. 7 and 8, pg. 
81; Wilkins vs. Young, 144 Ind. 
1; 41 NE 68; Swartzbaugh vs. 
Sampson, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 
451, 54 Pac. (2d) 73.) 
(2) Even where one contributes the 
entire purchase price for land 
but places it in joint tenancy 
with another, the rights of 
each in and to the land are the 
same and the one who makes 
the contribution has by that act 
1nade an immediate gift to the 
other. C~Iader Ys. Stemler, 319 
Pa. 37 4; 179 Atl. 719; Re Coch-
ran 3±2 Pa. 108; 20 Atl. (2d) 
305 ; 135 ALR 1058.) 
(2) As to one another and as to 
third parties, joint tenants are 
seized of equal undivided inter-
ests in the property. ( 2 Alneri-
can Law of Property (1952), 
Sec. 6.10.) 
SPECIAL NOTE: 
The case of Ga'l"rett vs. 
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Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 Pac. 
(2nd) 449, is clearly distin-
guishable bec.ause (a) a tenancy 
in common was involved; and 
(b) it was litigation between 
two tenants in common and did 
not involve third persons. 
Hence, the rule that the parol 
evidence rule does not prevent 
parties on one side of a written 
contract from showing by parol 
evidence what the agreement is 
between themselves. (For an 
annotation on the admissibility 
of p.arol evidence to overcome 
the presumption that tenants in 
common have equal interests 
where the title instrument does 
not disclose the proportionate 
interests in actions between the 
tenants or their priVIes, see. 
156 ALR 515. 
The appellant for fifteen years and eight months 
permitted the title to the mortgaged premises to stand 
on the public deed records of Salt Lake County in the 
names of herself and Francis Boydell Goeltz in joint 
tenancy ;and thereby she held out to the world and to the 
Respondent in particular that Mr. Goeltz owned an undi-
vided one-half interest in the same. In the year 1936 
she and Mr. Goeltz, her then husband, borrowed from 
Respondent the sum of $6,000.00 upon the security of a 
mortgage on the premises, which mortgage she admits 
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she executed and which she admits was valid. The status 
of the title on May 10, 1948 (the date of the mortgage, 
Etx. 10 P) was exactly the same as it was on October 27, 
1936 (the date of the mortgage owned by Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Co., Ex. 4 P). Respondent relied upon 
this public record as to the status of the title to the 
property when it made the 1948 loan. It was clearly 
entitled to do so because of Appellant's acts in regard to 
the same. Not only did she join her then husband in 
executing the 1936 mortgage \vhen the title stood in their 
names as joint tenants, but for a decade and a half there-
after she permitted the public record title to remain in 
the same status. No clearer case of estoppel in pais can 
be established - an estoppel 'vhich denies Appellant's 
right to prove by extraneous evidence that the ownership 
of the premises was other than it was on the public 
records and upon \vhich Respondent manifestly relied in 
making the 1948 loan. This estoppel operates against 
Appellant's .adverse clain1 - not at any tin1e asserted 
by her prior to this la\Y suit - that Francis Boydell 
Goeltz did not own an undivided one-half interest in the 
mortgaged pren1ises. The trial court properly excluded 
evidence in support of such clain1 as the Respondent \Yas 
entitled to rely upon the representations n1ade by ... A .. ppel-
lant through the operation of the public deed records. 
The authorities cited above support Respondent's posi-
tion beyond per-adventure. 
It is clear beyond .argun1ent that as to defendant, 
Francis Boydell Goeltz, the note, 1nortgage and agree-
ment of May 10, 19-±8, (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P) are binding 
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upon him and enforceable against him personally and 
also that the lien of the mortgage (Ex. 10 P) attached to 
and bec.ame an encumbrance upon his undivided one-half 
interest in the mortgaged premises held and owned by 
him at the time he executed and delivered these instru-
ments to the plaintiff. 
POINT V. 
FORM AND REQUIREMENTS OF JUDGMENT. 
1. STATEMENT AS TO FORM OF JUDGMENT 
Respondent submits that the rules of law above set 
forth as applied to the ultimate facts which are estab-
lished by the evidence in this case entitle it to the judg-
ment entered by the trial court awarding it relief as 
follows: 
1. There should be a joint and several judgment 
against the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, and Ap-
pellant, Marian Story Goeltz, for the sum of $3,224.41, 
plus interest at 4¥2% per annum from February 1, 1953, 
both before and after judgment. 
Comment: The note ;and mortgage dated October 27, 
1936 (Exs. 22 P and 23 P) were joint and several obliga-
tions; hence a joint and several judgments against de-
fendant~ is proper. Interest on the total principal mort-
gage obligation ($6,803.05) was paid to February 1, 1953. 
(Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard, R. 64, Ex. 12 P, Ex. 
13 P). The princip.al amount of $3,224.41 is the exact 
amount paid The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Com-
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pany in satisfaction of its obligation and Respondent is 
subrogated to the rights of the insurance company under 
its mortgage for this amount plus interest at the rate 
of 41/2 % per annum from February 1, 1953, both before 
and after judgment. A personal joint and several judg-
ment against the defendant mortgagors was proper and 
is legally sustained. 
2. There should be a separate judgment against de-
fendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, alone for the sum of 
$3,579.44, plus interest at 4¥2% per annum from Febru-
ary 1, 1953, both before and after judgment, plus interest 
at 3;i% per month on delinquent instalhnent of interest, 
together with attorney's fees in the sum of $750.00 and 
Respondent's costs and disbursements, including cost of 
abstract of title extension and costs on sheriff's sale. 
Comment: The defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, is 
alone liable on the note, mortgage and agreement of May 
10, 1948 (Ex. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P). The principal an1ount of 
judgment against hin1 represents the difference between 
the total principal a1nount due plaintiff, viz. $6,803.85 
(testimony of Henry E. Ogaard, R. 64) and the amount 
of $3,224.41 p.aid The Pacific ~Iutual Life Insurance 
Cornpany and for 'vhirh the defendants are jointly and 
severally liable a~ above set forth in 1 supra ($6,803.85 
minus $3,:22-t.-t-1, equals $3,579.4-1:). Interest on this 
an1ount of $3,579.-t-l- also eonnnences on February 1~ 1953~ 
the date to 'vhieh interest 'vas paid to Respondent. The 
judgutent against Fr.aneis Boydell Goeltz '"ill also include 
costs of abstract of title extension, $750.00 attorney's fees 
and costs incurred and to be incurred by Respondent. 
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These items are authorized by the note and mortgage 
dated May 10, 1948, supra. 
3. The judgment should provide that the mortgage 
of October 27, 1936, and the mortgage of March 10, 1948, 
be e,ach foreclosed and that the mortgaged premises be 
sold by and under the direction of the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, according to the following described 
formula and process: 
(a) All of the right, title, claim and interest of the 
Appellant, Marian Story Goeltz, in and to the mortgaged 
permises and all of the right, title, claim and interest of 
the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, (other than the 
undivided one-half interest of said defendant, Francis 
Boydell Goeltz, in and to the mortgaged premises which 
will be sold under and by virtue of the order of sale 
issued pursuant to (b) infra) in and to the mortgaged 
premises, should be sold to satisfy the joint and several 
judgment against Appellant, Marian Story Goeltz, and 
the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, in the principal 
amount of $3,224.41, plus interest as above set forth. A 
separate order of sale should be issued by the Clerk 
on this judgment, directing the sale of the respective 
interests of the said defendants in the mortgaged pre-
mises. The Sheriff should be directed to give separate 
notice of this s,ale and hold the sale separately. This sale 
must be noticed and held prior to the sale directed 
in (b) infra. Any party to this action may bid at the 
sale. The Respondent may use its joint and several judg-
ment against said defendants as cash, after paying the 
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Sheriff's costs of sale in cash. 
(b) The undivided one-half interest in the mort-
gaged premises of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, 
should be sold subsequently to the sale directed in (a) 
supra to satisfy the separate and individual judgment 
against him in the principal amount of $3,579.44 plus 
interest, cost of abstract of title, attorney's fees and 
costs as above set forth. A separate order of sale should 
be issued by the Clerk on this judgment dire·cting the 
sale of said undivided one-half interest of said defendant. 
The Sheriff should be directed to give separate notice of 
this sale and hold the sale separately. Any party to 
this action may bid at the sale. The plaintiff may use 
its said judgment as cash, after paying the Sheriff 
costs of sale in cash. This s.ale should be held second 
in time. 
Comment: The mortgage of October 27, 1936 (the Pacific 
Mutual mortgage) bound all of the interest of appellant, 
Marian Story Goeltz, in the premises and all of the inter-
est of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, in the pre1nises. 
The execution of the n1ortgage of !fay 10, 1948, by 
the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, had the legal 
effect, as above den1onstrated, of binding his undivided 
one-half interest in the n1ortgaged premises as here-
inafter indentified. As a consequenee the individual 
judgment against hiu1 should be satisfied out of the 
sale of this undivided one-half interest as hereinafter 
identified. 
Equitable consider,ations dictate separate sales which 
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will give rise to separate rights of redemption. It must 
be kept in mind that on the respective dates of the 
mortgage of October 27, 1936, and the mortgage of May 
10, 1948, that the defendants were owners in joint 
tenancy of the mortgaged premises and that the rights of 
Respondent under these mortgages are determined as of 
s.aid dates. Subsequent conveyance of the premises will 
not affect these rights as the sheriff's sale of the pre-
mises carries the respective ownership of the defendants 
as of said dates. 
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES 
(a) References to Utah Stattttes and Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
"Sales of real property under judgments of 
forclosure of mortgages are subject to redemption 
as in case of s.ales under execution generally* * *" 
(Sec. 78-37-6, Utah Code Ann. 1953). 
"Property sold subject to redemption, or any 
part sold separately may be redeemed by the 
following persons or their successors in interest 
(1) The judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a 
lien by judgment or mortgage on the property 
sold, or some share or part thereof, subsequent to 
that on which the property was sold." (Rule 69 
f (1) Utah R.C.P.) 
"* * * If the debtor redeems the effect of the 
sale is termin.ated and he is restored to his 
estate. * * *." (Rule 69 f (5) Utah R.C.P. 
"Upon a sale of real property the officer shall 
give the purchaser a certificate of sale * * *. The 
real property sold shall be subject to redemption, 
except where the estate sold is less than a lease-
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hold of a two-years unexpired term, in which event 
said sale is absolute." (Rule 69 f (1) Utah Rules 
C.P.) 
(b) Legal title does not pass under mortgage 
foreclosure sale, and new owner is not 
substituted until the sale is consummated 
by a Sheriff's conveyance. The judg-
ment debtor is, in contemplation of law, 
the owner of the p·roperty sold under 
execution during the redemption period 
and has right to its use and occupancy. 
The purchaser's interest is an equitable 
interest during period of redemption, 
subject to be lost, cancelled or taken 
away by the debtor, any redemptioner or 
their assigns. (Local Realty Co. vs. 
Lundquist, 96 Utah 297, 25 Pac. (2d) 
770, at pg. 772.) 
The above doctrine was cited with 
approval in Layton vs. Layton, 105 Utah 
1; 140 Pac. (2d) 759, 762. 
(c) When the judgment debtor redeems fro,m 
the effect of the sale is terminated and 
he is restored to his former estate. 
Therefo're a s~tbordinate lien is not di-
vested or destroyed by reason of the re-
demption by the judgment debtor or 
assigns of the property front a sale 
under a prior lien. It is revived and 
becomes effective and may be enforced. 
De Roberts vs. Stiles, 24 Wash. 211; 
64 Pac. 795; 
Stryker vs. Dunn, 72 Colo. 45; 209 
Pac. 644, 645; 
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Ford vs. N akomis State Bank, 135 
Wash. 37 ; 237 Pac. 314; 
Flanders vs. Aumack, 32 Ore. 19; 51 
Pac. 447; 
Porter vs. Steel Comp.any, 122 U.S. 
267; 7 Sup. Ct. 1206; 
Horton vs. l\1offat, 14 Minn. 289; 
100 Am. Dec. 222 ; 
Freeman on Executions (2nd) Sec. 
182; 
Curtis vs. Millard, 14 Iowa 128; 81 
Am. Dec. 460 ; 
Milhoover vs. Walker, 636 Colo. 22; 
164 Pac. 504; 
Warren vs. Fish, 7 Minn. 432 ; 
Kilpatrick Bros. Co. vs. Campbell, 
48 Idaho 194; 281 Pac. 471; 
42 Corpus Juris, pg. 451-453; 
18 Cal. J ur. pg. 599, Sec. 815; 
19 R.C.L. 655; 
Bateman vs. Kellog, 59 Cal. App. 
464; 211 Pac. 46, 51, 52; 
Kopp vs. Thele, 104 Minn. 267; 116 
NW 472; 17 L.R.A. (NS) 981; 
Am. Jur., Mortgages, Vol. 37, Sec. 
854. pg. 229. 
The difference in .applicable rule in 
Utah where certificate of sale does not 
pass title and the mortgagor is entitled 
to possession during period of redemp-
tion, and the Montana rule where the 
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certificate passes title and gives the 
purchaser the right to charge mortgagor 
for use .and occupancy during the period 
of redemption is illustrated in 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 51 Mont 509; 
154 Pac. 72·3; Dipple v. Nevill, 82 
Mont. 280; 267 Pac. 214. 
(d) Under Rule 69 f (5) Utah R.C.P. the 
term "judgment debtor" includes "suc-
cessor in interest," and the effect of a 
reden~ption by a "successor in interest" 
is to terminate the sale and the "Judg-
rnent debtor" or his "successor in inter-
est" are restored to the former estate of 
the "judgment debtor." 
(Bateman v. Kellog, 59 Cal. App. 464; 
211 Pac. 46, 51, 52) 
SPECIAL NOTE : 
The I{ansas cases holding that a 
reden1ption fron1 a foreclosure sale on a 
first or prior n1ortgage by the judgn1ent 
debtor or successor in interest bars fore-
closure on a junior n1ortgage thereafter 
are based upon a statute which forbids 
such foreclosure and declares that the 
only ren1edy of a junior n1ortgagee is 
by exercise of right of reden1ption. 
Hence the rule is not applicable in l~tah. 
(McFall v. Ford, 133 Kan. 593 ~ 1 Pac. 
(2nd) 273) 
Further the /( ansas and Montana 
statutes expressly forbid the sale of the 
right of rede1nption on execution sale. 
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(Sigler vs. Phares, 105 Kan. 115; 
181 P.ac. 628; 5 ALR 145; Hamilton v. 
Hamilton, supra) 
The Utah statutes and Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not forbid the sale 
of the right of redemption by execution. 
3. ARGUMENT 
Four important facts must be borne in mind: (a) 
the Appellant and defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, 
owned of record as joint tenants the mortgaged premises 
on dates of both the 1936 and 1948 mortgages; (b) there 
are no intervening liens or mortgages between the date 
of the 1936 mortgage and the 1948 mortgage; (c) the 
Appellant did not acquire sole ownership of the mort-
gaged premises until the decree of the Third District 
Court in the first divorce action dated March 31, 1952-
practically four years subsequent to the execution of 
the 1948 mortgage; and (d) the rights of all parties will, 
of course, be determined by the status of the property 
at the time the 1936 and 1948 mortgages were given. 
The acquisition by Appellant of sole ownership of the 
property long subsequent to the dates of these mort-
gages does not affect the rights of Respondent under 
these mortgages. The subsequent sole ownership by 
Appellant of the property affects the right of redemp-
tion only. 
(a) The joint and several judgment against 
Appellant and Defenda1'&t, Francis Boy-
dell Goeltz for amottnt paid Pacific 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. in satisfac-
tion of the 1936 1nortgage is proper. 
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The note (Ex. 22 P) is a joint and several obligation 
of Appellant and Defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz 
(Sec. 41-1-18 (7), Utah Code Ann. 1953). Respondent 
by subrogation succeeded to all rights of the owner of 
the note (Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.) and is 
therefore entitled to a joint and sever.al judgment against 
the maker for the amount ($3,224.41) paid by Respon-
dent in satisfaction thereof, together with interest at 
4¥2% per annum from Feb. 1, 1953-the date to which 
interest has been paid. No costs or attorneys fees are 
included in this judgment. 
(b) The several judgment against defendant, 
Francis Boydell Goeltz, is proper. 
The defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, is alone 
liable on the 1948 note and mortgage for the amounts 
specifically set forth in Point V. 2. Attorneys fees and 
costs must be chargeable against him only. From the 
total amount due on the 1948 mortgage there was de-
ducted the amount of $3,224.41, for \Yhich Respondent 
sucures judgment against Appellant and s.aid defendant, 
jointly and severally. The balance is charged against 
Francis Boydell Goeltz alone. The Court in its equitable 
powers had the right and duty to 1nake this division 
and apportionment. 
(c) The Court ~ra.s 'requ.ired to order the 
Htortgaged pre nz ise s to be sold f-irst to 
satisfy the joint and se·veral judgtnent 
against Appellant and defendant, Fra·n-
cis B oydell Goeltz. 
Respondent, under its subrogation to the rights of 
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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. under the 1936 mort-
gage, proceeded in the same manner as the Insurance 
Company would have done in foreclosing this mortgage. 
The 1936 mortgage was a first and prior lien on the 
mortgaged premises and since Appellant and defendant, 
Francis Boydell Goeltz, were jointly and severally liable 
thereon, it was proper and necessary to order sold all 
of their interests in the mortgaged premises as they 
existed on the date the 1936 mortgage was executed. 
The Court had no alternative except to order that this 
sale be held first, with the same consequences as would 
have resulted had the Insurance Company obtained the 
judgment and was the successful mortgagee-plaintiff. 
It is at this point that the doctrine of Local Realty 
Co. vs. Lundquist, supra, becomes of extreme importance. 
According to this decision, the effect of a Sheriff's sale 
in Utah is not to vest the successful bidder at such sale 
with legal title to the premises. He secures the right 
(equitable in nature) upon the expiration of the period 
of redemption, if no redemption is made, to the Sheriff's 
deed. It is this deed which conveys the ti~l~ to the pur-
chaser-not the certificate of sale. The legal title re-
mains in the judgment debtor or succe·ssor in interest 
with the right of possession, rent free, during the period 
of redemption. The right to redeem from the sale is in 
the debtor or successor in interest exclusively when no 
judgment creditor or junior mortgagee is involved (Rule 
69 f (1), U.R.C.P.), and under Rule 69 f (5), supra, the 
term "judgment debtor" includes "successor in interest." 
(Bateman v. Kellog supra) (The California statute as 
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to redemption reads exactly as Rule 69 f (5).) 
When the Sheriff's sale under this provision of the 
instant judgment is held, the successful bidder will re-
ceive a certificate of sale, but will not at that time acquire 
legal title to the premises. The legal title will remain 
in the judgment debtors (the Goeltz's) or their "suc-
cessor in interest." The Appellant remained the owner 
of an undivided one-half interest in the premises. The 
deed to Davis and from Davis to Appellant did not 
alter this interest. Appellant acquired by the Davis 
deed (.and the decree of March 31, 1952) the interest 
of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz. As to him and 
his interest in the premises, Appellant was a "successor 
in interest". The provision of the judgment under con-
sideration does not and cannot in any respect impair 
or limit the right of redemption. The right of redemp-
tion under this f'ir st sale will be vested in Appellant and 
she alone has the right to redeem as defendant, Francis 
Boydell Goeltz, transferred all of his interest in the 
premises to Appellant and there are no judg1nent credi-
tors or junior n1ortgagees. It 'vill be noted that the doc-
trine of Local Realty Co. \Yas approved in the subsequent 
decision of Layton vs. Layton) supra. A deficiency judg-
ment, joint .and several, against Appellant and Francis 
Boydell Goeltz, is proper inasn1uch as they are jointly 
and severally liable on the 1936 note (Exs. 22 P, 23 P). 
(d) The cou.rt correctly ordered tlzat a 
secon.d and subsequent sale be held 
covering the 'undz~vided o-ne-half inte·rest 
of defendant, F1·ancis Boydell Goeltz, in 
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the mortgaged premises, other than the 
interest of said defendant sold in the 
first sale. 
Keeping in mind (.a) that when the defendant, 
Francis Boydell Goeltz, executed the 1948 note and mort-
gage (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P) the title to the mortgaged 
premises was vested in Appellant and said Goeltz as 
joint tenants, and (b) that Respondent's rights under 
said note and mortgage must be deter1nined by the status 
of the title on the date of execution and delivery of said 
note .and mortgage, it is manifest that the interest of 
said defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, was burdened 
and was subject to the lien and claim of said 1948 mort-
gage when acquired by Appellant under decree of March 
31, 1952, and deeds issued pursuant thereto. It has 
been previously demonstrated that Francis Boydell 
Goeltz had the clear legal right to mortgage his interest, 
as joint tenant, in the premises to Respondent. The 
Appellant could not prevent such action. Therefore, 
Respondent acquired a lien on his interest, subject to 
the lien and claim of the 1936 mortgage. As between 
him and Respondent and as between him and Appellant 
he owned and held an undivided one-half interest. As 
to one and another .and as to third parties, joint tenants 
are seized of equal undivided interests in the property 
(American Law of Property, Vol. II, Sec. 6.1). 
The authorities cited above hold that a sever-
ance of the joint tenancy is effected by the act of one 
joint tenant mortgaging his interest to a third person 
and thereby the joint tenancy is converted into a tenancy 
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In common. Under this theory when Francis Boydell 
Goeltz executed and delivered November, 1948 mortgage 
he effected a seveTance of the joint tenancy estate to the 
extent of the mortgage lien (Wilkins vs. Young supra) 
and a tenancy in common of the mortgaged property re-
sulted. Respondent thereby became mortgagee of his 
undivided one-half interest therein. Even if this theory is 
not adopted, the 1948 mortgage created a lien on 
all of the interest in the n1ortgaged premises owned 
and held by the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, 
at the date thereof, and that interest was an undivided 
one-half interest. Under the doctrine of the Local Realty 
Co., the legal title to the premises, after the first sale 
will remain in Appellant: an undivided one-half interest 
in her own right under the Bronson deed .and an un-
divided one-half interest as the grantee of defendant, 
Francis Boydell Goeltz. I-Iowever, the undivided one-half 
interest coming to Appellant from Francis Boydell 
Goeltz will be subject to the lien of the 1948 mortgage 
and it is this interest which will be reached by the 
second sale. Upon this seco,nd sale there "~ill remain 
jn Appellant the full right of redemption fro1n the 
same as "successor in interest" of the judgn1ent debtor, 
Francis Boydell Goeltz. (Rule 69 f (1) l"Tt. R.C.P.; 
Bate1nan vs. l{ellog, supra). It "'"ill be observed that the 
Appellant retains eon1pletely the exclusive right of re-
demption fron1 this second sale as there are no judg1nent 
ereditors or junior n1ortgagees, and defendant, Francis 
Boydell Goeltz, by virtue of the decree of March 31, 
1952, and deeds executed pursuant thereto 'YHS divested 
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of all of his interest in the premises. 
(e) Exercise of statutory rights of redemp-
tion. 
The right of redemption in U t.ah is, of course, of 
statutory origin, even though it is now incorporated 
in the Rules of Civil Procedure. A judgment debtor or 
redemptioner must bring himself within the classes 
favored by Rule 69 f (1). Appellant is obviously within 
the class designated "judgment debtor". After the first 
foreclosure sale Appellant has the exclusive right to 
redeem from that sale. If and when she makes this 
redemption the effect of the sale will be terminated and 
she will be restored to her former estate. 'The authorities 
cited in (c) supra teach that the subordinate mortgage 
lien (1948 mortgage) held by Respondent will not be di-
vested or destroyed by reason of the redemption by 
the judgment debtor or assigns of the property from 
a sale under a prior lien (the 1936 mortgage). The lien 
under the 1948 mortgage is revived and becomes effec-
tive and may be enforced. The result is that Appellant, 
after redemption from the first sale, holds an undivided 
one-half interest in the property, free and clear of any 
lien. (This undivided one-half interest was her own 
and was not subjected to the lien of the 1948 note and 
mortgage because she did not execute them.) However, 
the undivided one-half interest which Appellant derived 
from defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, was subject to 
the lien of the 1948 mortgage because said defendant 
while owning the same voluntarily mortgaged it. Respon-
dent therefore is free to resort to this interest to satisfy 
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its claim under the 1948 mortgage. As above shown 
Appellant can redeem from this second sale (and she 
is the only person who can effect redemption) and 
thereby restore to herself the title to the entire property. 
(f) Disposition of surplus arising from 
sales. 
The principal argument of Appellant against the 
validity and correctness of the judgment as it pertains 
to the foreclosure sale appears to be centered about 
the disposition of .any surplus money which may arise 
from such sales. Such surplus must be paid into court 
to await the order of the court (R 198, R 201). There 
are no judgment creditors or junior mortgagees involved, 
and defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, has conveyed 
all of his interest in the mortgaged premises to Appel-
lant. Manifestly Appellant and only Appellant will be 
entitled to .any surplus funds arising from the sales. 
(Am. Jur. Mortgages, \Tol. 37, Sec. 873, pg. 249) 
PART B 
ANALYSIS OF APPELLANT'S LEGAL 
AUTHORITIES AND DEMONSTRATION OF 
ERRORS IN ARGUMENT 
Respondent hereinafter presents its interpretation 
and applieation of the legal authorities cited by .L£\.ppel-
lant, and demonstrates the errors and defects in the 
theories and argument of Appellant. (The Points here-
inafter indicated refer to Appellant's Points set forth 
in her brief.) 
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POINT I. 
Stockyards National Bank, etc. vs. Bragg (1926) 
67 Utah 60, 245 Pac. 966. 
The contention of Appellant that this case falls 
within the doctrine of the above decision is based upon 
a clear misunderstanding of the application of the rule 
there announced. There was no evidence adduced in 
the Bragg case on the question as to whether the adults' 
mortgage was given only on the condition that a valid, 
binding mortgage would be given by the guardian of 
the minors. The issue was decided on the pleadings 
(245 Pac. 975) The order of the Supreme Court re-
manded the action for a new trial with leave to the 
plaintiff to amend its complaint so as to be able to try 
on the merits the question as to conditional delivery 
of the adults' mortgage. The situation thus developed 
was finally elucidated by the Supreme Court in the 
case of Shibata vs. Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah 
395, 205 Pac. (2nd) 253, decided in 1949. The plaintiff 
in that case had signed the note and mortgage involved, 
both in the capacity as adminstratrix of her husband's 
estate and as an individual. At page 253 of 205 Pac. 
(2nd) the court wrote : 
"Having decided the note and mortgages 
were invalid and not binding on the estate, the 
question remains as to whether they were evi-
dence of a valid obligation of appellant, person-
ally. The officer of the bank who negotiated the 
loan testified that appellant was requested to 
sign personally as well as in her representative 
capacity upon the advice of the estate's attorney. 
He also testified that the bank would not have 
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made the loan unless the interests of all con-
cerned were included. The facts here are some-
what similar to the situation in the Stockyards 
case, supra. There the plaintiff, who was the 
obligee, pleads that its assignor agreed to extend 
the time of a past due obligation only on condition 
that the interests of both adults and· minors in 
certain Salt Lake City property were validly 
pledged as additional security for the payment of 
such obligation. In answer to this pleading the 
adult owners of the interests in the additional 
security specifically alleged that they delivered 
their note and mortgage pledging their interest 
in the additional security only on condition that 
the interests of the minors in that security were 
validly pledged for that purpose. They further 
alleged that the interests of the minors in that 
property were not validly pledged and therefore 
they were also not bound thereby. No evidence 
was introduced on this question but the trial court 
on these pleadings, or so its findings were con-
strued by this court, found that the note and mort-
gage of the adults 'vere delivered conditionally 
upon the validity of the pledge of the interests 
of the minors in the additional security. The trial 
court held that the n1inors' interests in that pro-
perty were validly pledged and ordered the Inort-
gage foreclosed. But this court reversed that 
holding, disn1issing the action as to the minors, 
and ,also said that on those pleadings and findings 
the adults 'vere entitled to a judgment in their 
favor, but ren1anded the n1atter for further hear-
ing as to the adults \Yith per1nission for the plain-
tiff to an1end its pleading. 
In remanding the ease for a further hearing 
with leave to a1nend, the court apparently acted 
in accord vvith the equities and the probable facts 
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of the case. It is hard to believe that a person 
in the business of loaning money would actually 
extend the time for payment of an overdue obli-
gation and advance additional money thereon, at 
a time when the existing security was apparently 
insufficient upon the delivery of notes and mort-
gages pledging additional property for the secur-
ity of such loan, with the understanding that the 
delivery of such notes and mortgages, even as 
to the adult mortgagors, w.as conditional upon the 
validity of the pledge of the interests of the 
minors in the additional security. Certainly the 
obligee would not agree to a proposition that 
would render the obligation of the adults a nullity 
merely because the obligation of the minors turned 
out to be invalid. 
In the instant case, the evidence is clear that 
the b.ank would not have made the loan unless 
it thought every one's interest in the land was 
validly pledged. But it does not follow that the 
delivery of the note was accepted by it condi-
tionally on the entire obligation being valid nor 
does it prove a conditional delivery of the note 
and mortgage on the part of Mrs. Shibata. The 
fact that an obligee insists upon having the bene-
fit of all parties interested in the property hypo-
thecated, does not tend to prove that the obligors 
agreed to be ob.ligated upon condition that all 
were obligated or none. Mrs. Shibata understood 
that she was mortgaging her property to help 
her son on his loan with the bank. As f.ar as 
she personally is concerned there is no evidence 
that she would not have executed the mortgages 
unless the estate was also obligated. She did not 
so contend nor plead. She merely pleaded that 
she did not understand that she was signing real 
property mortgages and thought th.at she was 
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only signing crop mortgages. The court found 
the evidence against her on this fact. From a 
reading of the record we cannot say that its find-
ings were unreasonable or not in accord with the 
evidence. It follows, therefore, from what we have 
said that the obligation of Mrs. Shibata, person-
ally, is valid and is binding upon her interest 
in the real property." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The instant case is manifestly within the rule of 
the Shibata case. To paraphrase the court's statement 
italicized in the above quotation: the fact that Respon-
dent insisted upon having the interests of both Mr. and 
Mrs. Goeltz in the property hypothecated does not tend 
to prove that ~Ir. Goeltz agreed to be obligated upon 
condition that 1Irs. Goeltz was obligated. In t~s con-
nection it should be noted that in his answer (R. 19, 20) 
Mr. Goeltz admits he executed and delivered the 1948 
note and mortgage in favor of Respondent. 'There is 
not a line of evidenee in the case that ~Ir. Goeltz con-
ditioned his execution of the 1948 note and mortgage 
upon Respondent securing a valid note and n1ortgage 
from l\1 rs. Goeltz. 
Further Appellant is by this argun1ent attempting 
to use a defense \vhieh belongs exclusiYely to l\Ir. Goeltz. 
When she denied her signature on the 19-±S note, nlort-
gage and agree1nent her defense stopped. It is none of 
her concern as to \vhether ~Ir. Goeltz delivered the 
note and 1nortgage on eondition ..._-\.ppellant executed .and 
delive1·ed saHle. l-Ie says he did not, but adn1its they 
are hif' binding obligations. That ends the 1natter. Not 
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only do the facts, themselves, deny Appellant's conten-
tion, but also the law is against her. 
Zinkeison vs. Lewis, 63 Kansas 590, 66 P.ac. 644, 
does not hold that the mortgage to which the husband 
forged his wife's name was void as to the husband. It 
sustains the plaintiff's right to be subrogated to the 
rights of holders of prior liens which were p.aid with 
plaintiff's money. The court said: 
"The right of subrogation, however, is not 
founded alone on the notes and mortgages, but 
is founded on all the facts and circumstances 
which give rise to the claim of subrogation." (66 
Pac. 646) 
See also Kuske vs. Staley, 138 Kansas 169, 28 Pac. (2nd) 
728, wherein the Zinkeison decision is cited in support 
of the right of subrogation even in a case where the 
mortgage is wholly void because of the forgery of the 
signature of the lone mortgagor. 
Serial Building and Loan .Assn. v. Eberhardt, 95 
N. J. Eq. 607; 124 Att. 56: 
This decision does not in any respect deal with the 
validity of .a mortgage which was executed by the hus-
band but not by the wife. It affirms the right of the 
mortgagee of said mortgage who advanced money to pay 
off a prior existing mortgage to be subrogated to the 
valid lien of such prior mortgage. The Court declared: 
"It would be a most inequitable decision that 
would declare dissolved the lien upon the property 
in which she (the wife) clairns an inchoate right 
of dower and so defeat that much of the consider-
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ation which she and her husband had received 
upon a valid instrument which no longer exists 
through no fault of the complainant whose money 
she had enjoyed." 
Davis vs. Pugh, 81 Ark. 253, 99 SW 78, affirms the 
doctrine of subrogation in a case where the holder of 
a mortgage not signed by a wife pays a prior mortgage. 
This decision in fact holds that the note signed by the 
husband alone secured by the subsequent mortgage (the 
signature of the wife thereto not being genuine) was 
effective to toll the statute of limitations. 
"Appellants insist that the note secured by 
the old mortgage is barred by the statute of limi-
tation, and that the right of subrogation is also 
barred. It is sufficient in answer to this conten-
tion, to say that the debt was kept alive by the 
new note executed by Davies, the debtor." 
Carey vs. Hart, 208 Alaba1na 316, 94 Southern 298. 
The wife's signature was not forged. The mortgages 
were. void "for the reason that they 'vere not signed 
and separately ackno"\vledged by the wife as the Consti-
tution and statute of this State require in the case of 
conveyance of hon1estead." A Constitutional and statu-
tory mandate voided the Inortgage. Forgery of the 'vife's 
signature w.as not involved in the ease. 
Home OuJners Loan {Jorporation l,S. Papara, 241 
Wis. 112, 3 N\V (2nd) 730, does not declare that the 
n1ortgage in favor of H.O.L.C. (the proceeds of which 
were used to pay a prior 1nortgage and delinquent taxes) 
was void as to the executing tenant in common. Rather 
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it sustains the right of subrogation against co-tenants 
who did not execute the H.O.L.C. mortgage and also 
against the claim of dower of the wife of the executing 
tenant. (This decision is of particular interest in con-
nection with appellant's claim of negligence on part of 
Respondent. See Appellant's Point II). 
Kaminskas v. Capanskis, 369 Ill. 566, 17 NE (2nd) 
558, upholds the right of subrogation against the in-
choate dower claim of the wife of the mortgagor who 
did not sign the refunding mortgage. The validity of 
the refunding mortgage was not in issue except as to 
its effect upon the wife's right of dower. It was not void. 
Hall vs. Marshall, 139 Mich. 123, 102 NW 658, up-
holds the right of subrogation in favor of a refunding 
mortgage against the claim of mortgagor's widow that 
she held a homestead in the mortgaged premises. The 
wife did not execute the refunding mortgage. By a 
Michigan statute a mortgage on a homestead was void 
if not executed by both husband and wife. The court 
held that the evidence did not establish that the widow 
held a homestead in the mortgaged premises. 
K rost v. K ieg ,____________________ Mo. ____________________ , 46 SW 
(2nd) 866. Although the refunding notes and mortgage 
were spurious and forged, and therefore void, the court 
allowed the intervenor which held these void notes and 
mortgage to be subrogated to rights under a prior valid 
mortgage. The refunding notes were void because the 
signatures of both mortgagors had been forged. There 
was no valid signature on the1n. 
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POINT II 
Home Owners Loan Corporation vs. Papara, 241 
Wis. 112, 3 NW (2nd) 730. A quotation from the 
opinion will suffice : 
"Respondent argues that the doctrine of sub-
rogation is inapplicable in this case by reason of 
the negligence on the part of the plaintiff in 
failing to take steps to obtain a properly executed 
mortgage. Even in the case of negligence, how-
ever, one who is not a volunteer is entitled to 
equitable assignment in the absence of interven-
ing equities. Iowa County Bank vs. Petty, 1927, 
192 Wis. 83, 91, 92, 211 N\V 134, 137 : '* * * From 
the very nature of this doctrine of subrogation 
its mantle must many times, like the garment of 
charity, cover and wipe out a number of sins 
of omission or co1nn1ission. The doctrine of sub-
rogation rests upon the theory of unjust enrich-
ment * * >)(:.' In the instance case those having an 
interest in the property, Tony's wife and co-
tenants, as well as Tony, alike received the bene-
fits of the H.O.L.C. loan, the payment of an 
existing n1ortgage valid as against their interest 
* * * ; and none of the1n has changed nor been 
induced to change his position by reason of the 
satisfaction of Building Loan ~-\.ssociation Inort-
gage. * * * In this situation any negligence on 
the part of plaintiff in failing to safeguard 
against any defeets in the execution of the mort-
gage cannot bar it fron1 the right of subrogation." 
Horne Owners Loan Corporation vs. Collins, 120 
N. J. Eq. 266, 18-l: ... -\.tl. 6~1. 
N egligenee on the part of the n1ortgagee in guarding 
against defects in execution of his 1nortgage will not 
bar him fron1 the right of subrogation to valid prior 
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liens which were paid with proceeds of his mortgage. 
Hughes v. Thomas, 131 Wis. 315, 111 N.W. 474, 
11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 74 
The negligence of the mortgagee (the proceeds of 
his mortgage ... #ere used to pay a prior valid mortgage) 
in securing only the signature of the life tenants to 
his mortgage, did not bar his right of subrogation. 
The question as to whether the negligence of the 
person advancing funds used to discharge a prior lien 
can arise only when there are intervening liens. There 
were no intervening liens in this case. (Ex. 2 P). Appel-
lant has, therefore, misapplied the doctrine of negligence. 
Even where there is an intervening lien subrogation js 
allowed. (Am. Jur. Vol. 50-Subrogation, Sees. 107-109, 
pgs. 750-752.) Oppositely the rule is clearly established 
that 
"}ifere negligence of the one seeking subroga-
tion in failing to procure a properly executed 
mortgage will not, at least in the absence of 
intervening equities, defeat his right to subroga-
tion." (Am. Jur. Vol. 50, Sec. 95, pg. 744) 
POINT III 
41 O.J.S. Sec. 251, p. 735 
"With some qualifications, the general rule 
is that property purchased with money from a 
wife's separate estate beco1nes her separate prop.,. 
erty, and as such is not liable to her husband's 
creditors for his debts, even though the prop-
erty it taken in the joint names of husb.and and 
wife or in the husband's name, in the absence of 
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a showing of the wife's intention to make a gift 
to him." 
The following decisions are cited by the editor of 
the above excerpt supporting the rule there elucidated: 
Gooch vs. Weldon Bank & Trust Co., 176 N.C. 213, 
97 S.E. 53. This was an action between the wife and 
the husband's administrator wherein the wife asserted 
that the deceased husband had taken possession of and 
managed her separate estate, selling certain property 
and reinvesting the proceeds. The rights of third per-
sons were not concerned. The court rightfully upheld 
the wife in her contention, as the North Carolina Con-
stitution had emancipated married women and they re-
tain title to their own separate property upon marriage. 
Commercial Bldg. Co. vs. Parslozc, et al., 93 Florida 
143, 112 Southern 378 is another case cited in support 
of the above quotation from C.J.S. This "~as a direct 
attack by re1naindern1en ( t\YO of who1n were married 
women) against the ultin1ate grantee of the life tenant 
who had asserted complete and exclusiYe O\Ynership of 
a parcel of land under the '"ill of her father which 
devised to her a life estate "Tith ren1ainder on her death 
to nephews and nieces. t\YO of \Yhonl \Yere the n1arried 
plaintiffs. The eourt recognized the ownership under 
~-,lorida's constitution of the separate property by the 
two 1narried ( 'von1en) re1naindern1en and held that be-
cause of their en1ancipation under the Florida la\Y they 
were guilty of laches in not proseeuting their suit earlier 
after tl?-ey l1ad kno,vledge that the life tenant had as-
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serted a title antagonistic to them. This was a "straight 
line" attack on the title of defendants who were not third 
parties dealing with the title but were direct ultimate 
grantees of the premises from the life tenant. 
Kranjcec vs. Be.limat, 114 Montana 26, 132· P.ac. 
(2nd) 150. It will suffice to quote from the decision 
itself to prove its irrelevancy in this case : 
"We think that if the plaintiff had sho\vn 
that the wife's permitting the title to the property 
to remain in the husband had injured the plain-
tiff he might have been entitled to prevail under 
the rule followed in such cases as Terrill V8. 
Wheeler-Motter Thier. Co. 147 Okla. 77, 294 P.a,~. 
644 and War Finance Corp. vs. Erickson, 171 
Minn. 276, 214 N.W. 45, but no such showing was 
made here although fraud was alleged. * * * nor 
is there any S'Ltg gestion that the plaintiff was 
misled and extended credit to her husband by 
reason of the title to the lots being in the husband 
at any time." (Emphasis supplied.) 
Roberts vs. Farley, 290 Ky. 516, 161 SW (2d) 930 
follows the exact pattern of the Montana case summar-
ized above. The executing creditor of the husband ex-
tended no credit to him on the strength of the belief 
that the husband owned the automobile which was in 
fact owned by the wife. 
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Beagles, 333 Mo. 568, 
62 SW (2d) 800 is an example of the decisions which 
are cited in support of the quotation from C.J.S., supra. 
This case holds that a married woman in Missouri under 
the emancipation act can convey her separate property 
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without the consent or signature of the husband so as to 
bar his claim of courtesy. 
If Appellant's counsel in the instant case had con-
tinued his study of 41 C.J.S.-Husband and Wife-and 
had turned to Sec. 267, pg. 747 of the same volume he 
would have found this statement of the law: 
"Where the wife has permitted the husband 
to hold title to her separate property, or deal 
with it as his own, she is estopped to claim it 
ag.ainst persons who have extended credit to, or 
otherwise dealt with the husband in reliance on 
his apparent ownership." 
The principle thus set forth in confirmed in Terrell 
vs. Wheeler-Matter Mer. Co. and War Finance Corp. 
vs. Erickson cited in K ranjcec v. Belimak, supra. The 
Terrell case (per syllabus by the Court) holds: 
"Where a married wo1nan permits title to 
her land to remain in her husband's name for 
such length of time and under such circumstances 
and \vith knowledge actual and constructive of 
such facts as "~ould n1ake it inequitable for her 
to assert her rights, she \vill be estopped as against 
the right of her husband's creditors, \vho, with-
out negligence and \Vhile in good faith, \Vere liTIS-
lead there by to his da1nage in the extension of 
credit to the husb.and. ~, 
The War Finance Corporation ease, referred to 
supra contains the follo\ving congent declaration: 
''The case is that of a trusting \Yife 'vho has 
long pern1itted her husband to 1nanage as his 
own her property, to hold himself out to the busi-
ness \Vorld as the o\vner of it and \vho has been 
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satisfied with that appearance of things until 
beset by financial reverses. Then ,as to those who 
have relied upon the apparent condition of things, 
it is too late for the wife to assert her separate 
ownership. 12 R.C.L. 599." 
This rule applies on a foreclosure of a mortgage where 
the mortgagee relied upon the husband's treatment of 
the property as his own. (Rathbone v. Rathbun, 35 SW 
(2d) C~io. App.) 38. 
In addition to the C.J.S. citation ( 41C. J.S. Sec .. 
251, p. 735) Appellant cites the following decisions in 
support of Point III: Wallace vs. Riley, 2·3 Cal. App. 
(2nd) 669, 74 Pac. (2nd) 800; Long v. Duprey, 52 NY 
(2nd) 93 (sic); and Moskowitz vs. Marrow, 251 NY ~380, 
167 NE 506. These cases interpret and pass upon Cali-
fornia's and New York's statutes governing so called 
"joint tenancy" bank accounts. The parties thereto were 
either the original tenants or the executor or administra-
tor of the deceased "tenant" and the surviving tenants. 
In such actions evidence as to the "arrangements" be-
tween the joint owners other than evidenced by the bank 
deposit agreement was held admissible under the statutes. 
Manifestly the decisions have no relevancy in the instant 
case, inasmuch as they involve inter sese quarrels between 
the tenants or between a surviving tenant and the de-
ceased tenant's personal representative. 
POINT IV. 
O'Reilly vs. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 Pac. (2d) 770 
and Meagher vs. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 Pac. (2nd) 454, 
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treat of facts which put a grantee or mortgagee on notice 
as to defects in title to real property being purchased 
by him or mortgaged to him. The effect of actual notice 
of existence of a prior mortgage was considered in the 
0' Reilly decision and of possession by a third person 
in the M ea_qher case. They have no bearing on the present 
litigation because (a) Respondent is asserting no claim 
through the unauthorized signatures of Appellant; (b) 
if there were negligence on the part of Respondent in 
failing to safeguard against defects in execution of the 
1948 mortgage, this fact cannot bar its right of subroga-
tion under the 1936 mortgage owned by Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Con1pany (see authorities cited supra) 
and (c) the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, was on 
date of the 1948 mortgage a joint tenant of the mort-
gaged premises "\vith ~Irs. Goeltz and therefore was 
equally in possession of the premises \vith her. 
POIXT 'T 
Fidelity Trust and Sarings Bank rs. Willianzs, 285 
Ill. App. 139, NE (2nd) 739~ den1onstrates the established 
rule of law that ·•retention of possession by the grantor 
of the property conveyed is notice of his or her interest 
in the property, and to those clai1ning under the grantee". 
It has no bearing on this case for three reasons: (a) 
Respondent's right to be subrogated to the rights of 
the Pacific l\lutual Life Insurance Con1pany under the 
rnortgage of 1936 is based upon a Inortgage aclmowledged 
by Appellant to have been executed by her; (b) the 
title to the 1nortgaged pre1nises at the tiine of the nego-
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tiation of the 1948 mortgage was in and the premises 
were occupied jointly by Appellant and her husband, 
Francis Boydell Goeltz, and had been since the time it 
was acquired by them from the Bronsons, and (c) Re-
spondent claims no rights in the mortgaged premises 
under the unauthorized signature of Appellant on the 
1948 note, mortgage and agreement. 
POINT VI 
Respondent has heretofore demonstrated that it is 
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of Pacific Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. under the 1936 mortgage. Under 
Point II, Part A, it has discussed the case of Martin 
vs. Hickenlooper, supra. The assertion of Appellant that 
she must have agreed to allow Respondent to be subro-
gated to the rights of the 1936 mortgage is, of course, 
erroneous as the authorities clearly prove. Hickenlooper 
does not sustain such position. In all of the "wife for-
gery" cases there was obviously "non-agreement" by 
the wife. The modern and enlightened doctrine of subro-
gation is not based on contract, but 
"Being founded on principles of natural 
reason and justice, and being one of benevolence 
of the law, it is a highly f.avored doctrine, and' one 
which has been most liberally dealt with in the 
courts. Perhaps no doctrine of equity jurispru-
dence is more beneficial in its operations, and 
perhaps none stands in higher favor." (Am. Jur. 
-Subrogation-Val. 50, Sec. 15, pg. 693) 
Hickenlooper allowed subrogation against Martin, a. 
junior mortgagee. It was in this connection that the court 
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discussed the question of subrogation on the part of the 
refunding mortgagee, and even then concluded that 
"In diligence in searching the record will not 
prevent equity from applying the doctrine unless 
it is culpable or unjustifiable negligence. * * * ." 
(59 Pac. (2nd) 1152) 
In connection with Hickenlooper, Appellant has cited 
two other c.ases of which brief mention will be made. The 
first is 
McCollarn v. Lark, 187 Ga. 292; 200 S.E. 276, recog-
nizes the right of subrogation by a refunding mortgagee 
even against an intervening lien. There was no issue of 
negligence of the refunding mortgagee raised in this 
case. Involved was the right of subrogee to claim superior 
legal position against a lien \Vhich in previous litigation 
had been declared junior to the lien to \vhich the re-
funding mortgagee succeeded. 
The second case cited is Wilkin v. Gibson, 113 Ga. 
290; 38 SE 37 4, vvhich involves the rights of a junior 
lienor against a refunding n1ortgagee. Stated otherwise, 
the junior lienor clain1ed that the refunding n1ortgagee 
was negligent. The discussion of the Court involved this 
issue. It is obvious the c.ase has no application. No inter-
vening or junior lienor is present in the instant case. 
POINT VII 
Appellant has hereinbefore fully discussed the 
method and order of sale of the mortgaged property 
under Part A, P0int \r-Form and Requirements of 
Judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that it has demon-
strated that the trial court committed no error in its 
disposition of this action and that the judgment entered 
by it should be affirmed with costs against Appellant. 
FRANKLIN RITER 
Attorney for Respondent 
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